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1  Introduction
Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“the Constitution”) provides that no one may be deprived of property except 
in terms of law of general application and that no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. The subsection does not distinguish between 
substantive and procedural reasons for a deprivation being arbitrary. 
However, in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance1 (“FNB”) the Constitutional Court concluded that 
“a deprivation of property is ‘arbitrary’ as meant in s 25 when the ‘law’ 
referred to in s 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the particular 
deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair”. The rest of the FNB 
decision proceeds to analyse how substantive non-arbitrariness, in the 
sense of sufficient reason for the deprivation, is to be established, without 
saying anything about the meaning of the phrase “or is procedurally unfair”. 
However, from the phrasing of the passage cited earlier it must be concluded 
that a deprivation could be arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) either because 
it was substantively arbitrary in the sense that there is insufficient reason for 
it, as set out in the decision, or because it was procedurally unfair. Although 
procedural unfairness is not defined or even discussed further in FNB, it 
therefore apparently constitutes an independent ground for finding that a 
deprivation of property is arbitrary.
Although the court did not expand in FNB on procedural unfairness as an 
independent ground for a finding that a deprivation is arbitrary, this point was 
picked up in later case law. In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action 
Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and 
* This article was written as a presentation at the Annual Conference of the South African Property Law 
Teachers, hosted by the University of Namibia, Windhoek, 27-28 October 2011  It is based more or less 
directly on sections from AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) ch 4  Thanks to Sue-
Mari Maass and Bradley Slade for assistance with the research for the book and for valuable comments 
and to Geo Quinot, Janke Strydom and Carolien Koch for discussions and comments  Geo Quinot was 
particularly helpful in unravelling the possible meanings of the notion of procedural arbitrariness in its 
relation to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)
1 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100 (emphasis added)
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Housing, Gauteng2 (“Mkontwana”) it was said that procedural arbitrariness 
under section 25(1), just like the notion of procedural fairness in other 
contexts, was a flexible concept that had to be determined with reference to all 
the circumstances. On the basis of that finding the Constitutional Court held 
that every municipality is obliged to provide the owner of the property, upon 
written request, with copies of outstanding accounts for water and electricity 
services delivered to occupiers of their property.3 This decision creates the 
impression that procedural fairness, for purposes of section 25(1), will be 
assessed on the same basis as the test for just administrative action under 
section 33 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
In Reflect-All  1025 CC  v MEC  for  Public  Transport,  Roads  and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government4 (“Reflect-All”) the applicants argued that 
the relevant sections of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 
were procedurally unfair and therefore arbitrary because they did not provide 
a procedural mechanism by which the applicants’ rights could be protected. 
The Constitutional Court referred to the definition of procedurally unfair 
deprivation in Mkontwana,5 without adding anything to it, and proceeded to 
test the deprivation in question against the general standard set out in the earlier 
decision. The procedural attack on section 10(1) failed in this case because the 
court concluded that the consultative processes that did take place in terms 
of the old ordinance must be regarded as having been sufficient; further 
consultation was not necessary.6 Furthermore, the court found it “unrealistic, 
impractical and not in the public interest” to revisit the considerable number 
of road network designs published under section 10(3) and concluded that 
the procedures provided for in the Act were not procedurally arbitrary.7 
O’Regan J argued in her dissenting opinion that a procedure should have 
been provided to review long-standing plans, but she explicitly agreed with 
the majority that the deprivation brought about by the road determinations 
was not arbitrary for being procedurally unfair and focused her dissent on the 
substantive arbitrariness of the deprivation.8 In Offit  Enterprises  (Pty)  Ltd 
2 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 65, citing Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-
Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 SA 91 (CC) para 39; President of the Republic of South Africa 
v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 216; Janse Van Rensburg NO v Minister of 
Trade and Industry and Another NNO 2001 1 SA 29 (CC) para 24; Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 2 SA 1 (CC) para 19; 
Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association (Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 3 
SA 1151 (CC) para 101
3 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 
2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 66
4 2009 6 SA 391 (CC)  The applicants complained about the freezing effect that long-standing road design 
plans had on the use of their properties, particularly because the Act had come into operation after they 
had bought the properties and imposed heavier restrictions on their use of the properties than was the case 
under the preceding legislation  See paras 6-7, 16 and onwards on the facts and the legislation involved  
5 Para 40, referring to Mkontwana
6 Para 43
7 Paras 46, 47
8 Para 97
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v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd9 (“Offit”) the Constitutional 
Court did not expand on its earlier findings in Mkontwana and Reflect-All 
because it decided that the action complained of in Offit did not constitute a 
deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1).
Judging from these decisions, one might ask whether the notion of procedural 
fairness, as an indication of arbitrariness in the context of section 25(1), has 
any meaning at all. From the little that was said in FNB and Mkontwana 
it appears that limitations on the use and enjoyment of property would be 
assessed according to exactly the same principles that are relied on, outside 
of the sphere of section 25(1), to determine whether administrative action 
was procedurally fair. Apparently, procedural arbitrariness must therefore be 
adjudicated in terms of section 25(1), but according to administrative justice 
principles. However, this result is problematic. In a series of recent decisions, 
the Constitutional Court has formulated a principle to the effect that litigants 
who aver that a right protected by the Constitution had been infringed must 
rely on legislation enacted to protect that right and not on the underlying 
constitutional provision when bringing action to protect the right, unless they 
want to attack the constitutional validity or efficacy of the legislation.10 PAJA 
was clearly promulgated to give effect to the right to just administrative action 
(including procedural fairness) and thus action to protect that right should 
primarily be brought in terms of PAJA rather than either section 33 or section 
25(1). This principle suggests that deprivation of property that is allegedly 
procedurally unfair (in the sense of arbitrary) should be adjudicated in terms 
of PAJA rather than section 25(1) (or section 33). This conclusion, in turn, 
would imply that section 25(1) analysis should be restricted to substantively 
arbitrary deprivation of property. It therefore seems odd that the possibility 
was even raised in FNB (and followed up in Mkontwana and Reflect-All) that 
deprivations imposed on the use of property should be reviewed, to determine 
whether they were procedurally unfair, in terms of the non-arbitrariness 
requirement in section 25(1).
The remaining question is whether any meaning could be assigned to the 
notion of procedural arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) that would not be 
in conflict with the subsidiarity principle referred to earlier. In other words, 
are there instances where the alleged procedural unfairness of deprivations of 
property should, for sound constitutional reasons, be adjudicated in terms of 
section 25(1) rather than PAJA?
9 2011 1 SA 293 (CC)  The case concerned the Development Corporation’s efforts to obtain ownership of 
the land in question, in accordance with the legislation involved  There was never any real expropriation 
issue; see n 12 below
10 This principle is discussed in AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 
2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77 100-103, referring to South African National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC) paras 39-40; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) paras 59 (Skweyiya J), 69 (Ngcobo J)  The 
principle has been confirmed in Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 6 SA 129 (CC) paras 29-30; Nokotyana 
v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 4 BCLR 312 (CC) paras 47-49
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2  Procedural arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1)
The solution to this conundrum might appear from the differences 
between the cases in which the Constitutional Court has said something 
about procedural arbitrariness. To begin with, the context in FNB and 
Mkontwana was different from that in Reflect-All and Offit11 to the extent that 
the deprivation in the first two cases was imposed directly by the legislation 
in question and not by administrative action. If a deprivation of property is 
caused by administrative action, as was the case in Reflect-All and Offit, any 
procedural fairness challenge should be directed against the administrative 
action and therefore the procedural fairness question has to be assessed and 
answered in terms of PAJA and not section 25(1).12 Such an outcome would be 
consistent with the principle, referred to earlier, set out by the Constitutional 
Court.13 PAJA is clearly legislation that was promulgated to give effect to the 
right to just administrative action (including the right to procedural fairness) 
in section 33 and therefore any dispute involving allegedly procedurally 
unfair administrative action has to be decided in terms of PAJA. Section 
25(1) should then not feature at all. Section 25(1) does not explicitly guarantee 
procedural fairness and therefore it seems unjustified to ground any decision 
involving procedurally unfair administrative action on section 25(1) when 
the principles regarding procedural fairness are derived from and applied in 
terms of PAJA. In so far as administrative action is allegedly procedurally 
unfair, the matter should therefore be decided in terms of PAJA, with section 
33 as the underlying constitutional provision for purposes of interpretation 
or constitutional challenge – section 25(1) has no function if administrative 
action results in arbitrary deprivation of property.
However, review of procedural fairness in terms of PAJA would not have 
been possible in FNB or Mkontwana because there was no administrative 
action involved and therefore it was necessary in those cases, at least in 
principle, to determine whether the limitation was imposed in a procedurally 
fair manner by legislation.14 This review cannot be decided in terms of PAJA 
because PAJA does not find application in the absence of administrative action. 
If a deprivation is imposed directly by legislation, the question whether the 
deprivation is procedurally arbitrary can only be asked in terms of section 
11 The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that there was no administrative action involved in the case 
because there was no act of expropriation yet; see Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development 
Corporation 2010 4 SA 242 (SCA) (“Offit SCA”) para 44  A different question, which was not at stake in 
Offit SCA, is whether a failure to act, in a situation where an administrative body is obliged to act, would 
in itself constitute administrative action  On that point see J de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in South Africa (2003) 109-111, 184-186
12 The issue did not come up in Offit SCA because it was decided that there was no deprivation of property 
in that case
13 See n 11 above  
14 S 25(1) of the Constitution specifies that “[n]o law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”, without 
saying anything about administrative action  Deprivation caused by executive action may also not be 
adjudicable under PAJA; see De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action 109-111, 184-186; C 
Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 177-178  Those cases might also be adjudicated 
in terms of procedural unfairness in terms of s 25(1), but because of the wording of s 25(1) (“no law may 
permit” (emphasis added)) the attack has to be focused on the authorising legislation and not the executive 
action as such  
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25(1), which proscribes law that permits arbitrary deprivation. In all likelihood 
the question whether the deprivation was imposed in a procedurally unfair 
manner would in these cases be judged according to the same principles that 
apply in administrative law under PAJA, but the review takes place in terms 
of section 25(1).
If a deprivation caused by procedurally unfair administrative action might be 
substantively arbitrary as well as procedurally arbitrary, the plaintiff may have 
a choice between a procedural fairness remedy based on PAJA and a substantive 
arbitrariness remedy based on section 25(1). However, logically speaking the 
deprivation would be authorised either by legislation or by the common law and 
the authorising law might indicate which remedy would be preferable. If the 
substantive arbitrariness is caused by the exercise of administrative discretion 
or procedure, PAJA might be the preferred basis for litigation; if the deprivation 
is substantively arbitrary because of the impact it has on the affected property 
holder, a section 25(1) attack might be better. In either case it might be problematic 
to prove a procedural arbitrariness case on the basis of PAJA because section 3 
of PAJA requires proof of a negative, material impact on the plaintiff’s rights. 
Requiring strong proof that administrative action had a negative, material impact 
on the plaintiff’s rights might practically equal requiring proof of substantive 
arbitrariness, which would render the notion of procedural arbitrariness in terms 
of PAJA redundant, at least as far as deprivations caused by administrative 
action are concerned.15
The explanation of the meaning of procedural arbitrariness above, according 
to which procedural arbitrariness should be restricted to deprivations caused 
by legislation directly, is clouded by the decision in Reflect-All.16 In this case 
the deprivation was brought about by the administrative action involved in the 
publication of the road design and not directly by the legislation. According 
to the argument above, the procedural fairness aspect of the case should 
therefore have been decided with reference to PAJA and not section 25(1). The 
decision does not make the matter clearer, because the issue of procedural 
fairness is considered with reference to PAJA and the procedural-fairness 
obligations of the administration, but the conclusion in each instance refers to 
the procedural arbitrariness (referring to section 25(1)) of the sections of the 
legislation involved. In the end, the court decided that the relevant sections 
of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act were not procedurally unfair 
and that the deprivation they brought about was not arbitrary. Consequently, 
it remains unclear whether a finding of procedural arbitrariness would have 
rendered the relevant sections (rather than the administrative action involved 
in publishing the road designs) invalid. This leaves one with the impression 
that procedural unfairness that results in a deprivation might be arbitrary and 
therefore invalid in terms of section 25(1), even when the deprivation was 
caused by administrative action. From first principles this appears to be an 
unfortunate conclusion that should be avoided, especially given the ambiguity 
of the decision on this particular point. When administrative action in terms 
15 I am indebted to Geo Quinot for pointing this problem out to me
16 Compare nn 11 and 14 above
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of legislation is challenged, the challenge should be based on PAJA. When 
the authorising legislation (in this case the relevant sections of the Gauteng 
Transport Infrastructure Act) is challenged for permitting administrative 
deprivation of property that is procedurally unfair, the challenge should be 
based on section 33 of the Constitution.17 Procedural arbitrariness in terms of 
section 25(1) should only feature when PAJA does not apply for some reason. 
From that perspective it seems as if the procedural fairness aspect in Reflect-
All should simply have been decided with reference to PAJA and not on the 
basis of section 25(1).
3  Conclusion
In the absence of clearer indications from case law one might therefore 
assume that a deprivation of property would be arbitrary in terms of section 
25(1) either when there was insufficient reason for it, as set out in the FNB 
decision, or when the deprivation was procedurally unfair in terms of the 
principles that apply in administrative law, but not caused by administrative 
action. Presumably, this would apply mainly to instances where the 
deprivation was caused directly by legislation. In cases where procedurally 
unfair administrative action results in deprivation of property, the challenge 
should be brought on the basis of PAJA and section 33 and not section 25(1).
Even if the deprivation was not brought about by administrative action 
and procedural arbitrariness is decided in terms of section 25(1), procedural 
fairness should probably in any event be adjudicated on the basis of the 
procedural fairness principles developed in administrative law, simply 
because other suitable principles do not exist outside of administrative law. Of 
course, these principles may have to be adapted to the context within which 
section 25(1) challenges will take place. In administrative law, the right to 
procedurally fair administrative action is said to involve the possibility to 
influence the outcome of an administrative decision that might have a negative 
effect on a person’s rights.18 According to Klaaren and Penfold, this principle 
firstly entitles a person to be heard during the decision-making process and 
secondly it proscribes bias.19 In the absence of administrative action, in other 
words when the deprivation is caused directly by legislation, the rule against 
bias is possibly already embodied in the requirement that deprivation must be 
authorised by law of general application. This particular aspect of the general 
principle of procedural fairness might therefore not find much application in 
the context of section 25(1) challenges against legislation that directly causes 
deprivation of property, without administrative action.
As far as being heard is concerned, procedural fairness could probably 
only have two applications in cases where deprivation of property is caused 
17 See n 11 above and compare further Zondi v Member of the Executive Council for Traditional and Local 
Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) paras 99-102
18 J Klaaren & G Penfold “Just Administrative Action” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 4 2 ed (OS 2008) ch 63-81  See further De Ville Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 224-228; Hoexter Administrative Law 363  
19 Klaaren & Penfold “Just Administrative Action” in CLOSA ch 63-81  See further De Ville Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action 218, 217-286; Hoexter Administrative Law 397-398
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directly by legislation. One possibility is cases where the deprivation would 
only be procedurally fair if the legislation provides for judicial oversight, 
as illustrated by a number of cases that were not decided with reference to 
section 25(1).20 A second possibility is cases where the deprivation would only 
be procedurally fair if the legislative scheme causing the deprivation provides 
for an occasional review procedure to ensure that the deprivation does not 
become arbitrary purely because of its duration. This possibility might have 
found application in the Reflect-All case, especially as far as the dissenting 
judgment of O’Regan J is concerned,21 but unfortunately neither the majority 
nor O’Regan J clearly distinguished between PAJA review and section 25(1) 
review of the legislation in question.
The interpretation of the notion of procedural arbitrariness proposed 
in this article results in two interlinked conclusions. Firstly, the general 
principle should be that the question whether deprivation of property caused 
by administrative action is procedurally unfair must be decided in terms of 
PAJA and not in terms of section 25(1). Secondly, deprivation of property 
could apparently be procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) when the 
deprivation is not brought about by administrative action. This would mostly 
be the case when the deprivation is caused directly by legislation. In this case, 
statutory deprivation of property could probably be procedurally arbitrary and 
therefore unconstitutional if the legislation reasonably should, but in fact does 
not provide for either judicial oversight or periodic review of the legislative 
framework that allows or brings about the deprivation.
SUMMARY
Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application and that no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court explained that a deprivation of property will fall foul of section 25(1) either 
when there is insufficient reason for the deprivation (as further explained in that decision) or if the 
deprivation is procedurally unfair. Nothing further is said in that decision about procedurally unfair 
deprivation. In subsequent case law the Constitutional Court picked up on the distinction between 
substantively and procedurally arbitrary deprivation, without making it clear when a deprivation will 
be procedurally unfair or how procedural unfairness in terms of section 25(1) should be distinguished 
from procedural unfairness in terms of section 33 or PAJA. The author argues that the notion of 
procedurally unfair deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) only makes sense to the extent 
that it refers to deprivation of property that does not result from administrative action. Consequently, 
deprivation of property brought about by administrative action should in the first place be adjudicated 
in terms of PAJA and not in terms of section 25(1) and only deprivation of property that occurs outside 
of the sphere of PAJA should be adjudicated in terms of section 25(1). However, as the author argues, 
the test for section 25(1) procedural unfairness will in any event probably resemble the PAJA test.
20 See for example Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) (decided with reference to 
s 26); Zondi v Member of the Executive Council for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 
589 (CC) (decided with reference to s 34)  
21 One could understand the minority opinion of O’Regan J in Reflect-All  1025  CC  v MEC  for  Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) in this spirit, although 
the judge explicitly agreed with the majority that the deprivation brought about by the road determinations 
were not arbitrary for being procedurally unfair and related her objection to the absence of a review 
procedure to the substantive arbitrariness of the deprivation
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